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Abstract 
The recent housing crisis has highlighted the need to better understand the determinants 
of mortgage default. Concerns about potential sizable differences in default rates by race and 
ethnicity as well as reports in the popular press regarding the propensity for rising numbers of 
homeowners to strategically default motivate a careful study of mortgage delinquency in 
America post-housing bubble. Using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), we examine borrowers in the years 2005, 2007 and 2009 and, controlling for a 
number of default-related variables, take a closer look at the characteristics of those delinquent 
on their mortgage by 2009. We find startling racial and ethnic gaps present as well as strong 
effects from children, education, and the presence of recourse/non-recourse laws in the state of 
residence on the likelihood of delinquency. In addition, we find evidence that strategic default 
plays a role in explaining the likelihood that a homeowner in 2005 will be delinquent on his or 
her mortgage by 2009. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In the late 1990’s and into the early 2000’s the economy was booming and housing prices 
were rising. This trend continued until early 2007 when the housing bubble effectually “burst” 
and prices began to decline rapidly. With the state of the economy declining borrowers were 
finding it more difficult to make their mortgage payments and foreclosures swept across the 
country in record numbers. In 2009, foreclosures increased by 21% from 2008 and more than 
120% from 2007 (Prior, 2010). Moreover, the median national house price was 25% lower than 
its peak in 2005 (Armour, 2009). By 2010, approximately 17 million homes were "underwater", 
in that the owners of these homes owned more on the bank loans than the homes were worth 
(Armour, 2009). In an attempt to stem the tide of foreclosures, as early as 2008, the Obama 
administration implemented the Making Home Affordable program to assist homeowners and 
stimulate the economy. However, the program, which was allotted $75 billion, has been met with 
heavy criticism and so far has proven only mildly successful. 
This housing crisis has led researchers to work double time, expanding their studies 
looking to hone in on the causes of default. Over the years two major fields of theory have 
developed explaining delinquency, default and subsequent foreclosure. The first being trigger 
events—those unforeseen events that drastically change one’s financial status leaving them 
unable to make their mortgage payments. Such events include divorce, death of a family 
member, medical expenses, job loss, etc. The second theory is one of strategic behavior, where 
borrowers choose to abandon their mortgage obligations despite being able to pay. This behavior 
is induced without any trigger event, any financial loss other than that loss of equity. With house 
prices dropping drastically, often homeowners find themselves owing more on their mortgage 
than their house is actually valued, and borrowers are finding it more advantageous to take a 
credit hit and abandon their house, mortgage and all, rather than continuing to make payments on 
their loan. 
While both theories deserve merit and have ample data and research to support them 
neither look at the demographics of those in default. The majority of the data used to derive these 
theories comes from loan data. These data provide detailed information on the characteristics of 
loans and how each reacts and develops in time based on payment history, refinancing options, 
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interest rates, credit history of owners, etc., but they offer little, if any information on the 
individual behind the loan. 
Using rich data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we are able to track 
individual households over the years and determine, based on their demographics, their 
likelihood of mortgage delinquency by the end of our study. Our sample is unique in that we 
have individual data on race, ethnicity, sex, age, education, employment, and other variables that 
are not captured in the loan data. Ours is the first to analyze the housing market using this type of 
data after the downturn in the market. 
We use weighted data on race, ethnicity, sex, children, age, marital status, and education 
combined with biennial data from 2005-2009 on income, wealth, employment, and equity to 
determine the likelihood of an individual being delinquent on their mortgage by 2009. We use 
state dummies to control for variations in local housing markets, economies and laws on 
recourse. After constructing the model we add in a non-recourse1 variable to determine whether 
or not living in a non-recourse state has any additional effect (Ghent 2010). 
We first implement a Linear Probability Model (LPM) and study the coefficient estimates 
finding robust results across all models. Later we implement a probit model to gain more 
efficient results and compare the two in turn. The results of the probit estimation provide for 
several significant inferences. We find that education, equity, and wealth all act as significant 
deterrents of delinquency. Conversely, we find large racial and ethnic gaps in the probabilities, 
where being a black or Hispanic head of household both increase the probability of being 
delinquent substantially. There are some differences in age groups, where middle aged (35-64) 
heads of households are more likely to be delinquent than retirement aged (65+) heads of 
households. Lastly we discover that living in a non-recourse state significantly increases the 
likelihood of being delinquent, supporting previous literature on the subject. 
                                                
1 Some states have specific laws outlawing recourse action against borrowers who have foreclosed. These 
“non-recourse” states have put in place laws to protect the borrower from what they see as excessive damages. 
Conversely, lenders in “recourse” states are able to take recourse action against borrowers, which usually includes 
legally coming after the borrower to fulfill their debt obligations. One common cost lenders may come after is the 
difference between the remaining amount on the mortgage and the fair market value of the house, but other costs 
include lawyer fees and other associated court costs. 
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The rest of the paper follows thus. In section 2 we present and review previous literature 
and findings on the subject. Section 3 discusses the economic theory behind the study. Section 4 
provides a description of the data used. Section 5 presents and explains the empirical models 
used. Section 6 reports the empirical findings. Section 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature 
The racial and ethnic gaps in mortgage delinquency are staggering. While the rate of 
homeownership for black and Hispanic heads of households has been well documented to be 
lower than their counterparts it fails to be seen why those black or Hispanic heads who succeed 
in homeownership are so much more likely to be delinquent. Turner and Smith (2009) note an 
alarming difference in homeownership rates. Less than 50% of black and Hispanic households 
own, while white, non-Hispanic households own 75% of the time. This gap in homeownership 
wouldn’t explain the increase in delinquency rates we find for these groups over their white, non-
Hispanic counterparts. It could be argued that those black and Hispanic heads that do own would 
be a “filtered” group effectively “chosen” to succeed. Turner and Smith (2009) explore this 
phenomenon by taking a look at the exit rates from homeownership by race, ethnicity and 
income using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Due to the manner in 
which the PSID is constructed Turner and Smith (2009) break their analysis up into two separate 
groups: households from 1970-1997 and those same households 1999-2005. Controlling for a 
number of factors (including crisis/trigger events), they find that black households post-1997 are 
4% more likely to exit from homeownership than non-black households. Before 1997, though, 
they find no gap between races. Boehm and Schlottmann (2004) support this latter finding using 
PSID data from 1984 to 1992 and report actually that black households are less likely to exit 
homeownership. Turner and Smith (2009) find higher exit rates for Hispanic households pre-
1997, however, they find no significant difference between the exit rates of Hispanic and non-
Hispanic households post-1999, concluding that “the low homeownership rates of Hispanic 
households in the U.S. post-1997 are due to low entry rates, not high exit rates.” 
Haurin and Rosenthal (2004) found results similar to Turner and Smith (2009). Using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) they show that African-American and Hispanic 
households have shorter spells of homeownership than white and non-Hispanic households. On 
average they find that white, Non-Hispanic first-time homeowners maintain homeownership for 
just over 16 years while African-American and Hispanic first-time owners maintain shorter 
spells of 9.5 and 12.5 years, respectively. Their estimates control for a number of factors such as 
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region, family size, employment and education. They also note that for the age group of 21 to 34, 
higher education substantially lessens these race and ethnicity gaps. 
Contrary to most publications, Quercia, McCarthy and Stegman (1995), using data on 
rural, low-income borrowers collected by the Housing Assistance Council, report that minority 
borrowers are less likely to default on their mortgage than non-minority borrowers. 
Demographically, they also find that being married and having more children both have positive 
effects on the likelihood of default and that female borrowers are less likely to default. 
The importance of crisis or trigger events has been well documented, often in conjunction 
with lower equity, but not always. The aforementioned Quercia, McCarthy and Stegman (1995), 
report that trigger events and “borrower-related events” are what significantly effect a borrower’s 
decision to default. They find that home equity has no significant effect on the borrower’s 
decision to default. Elmer and Seelig (1999) show that negative equity (a proponent of strategic 
default) is “neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for default...” They conclude that 
trigger events effecting income (job loss, medical expenses, etc.) have a much larger impact on 
default. It is these events, they argue, that cause a borrower to become insolvent and therefore to 
be unable to pay their mortgage. With that in mind it is obvious that the more equity a borrower 
has the more “cushion” they have if an income trigger event should occur. If a borrower has 
negative equity they will be unable to borrow emergency funds against the value of their house, 
however, if their equity remains positive they will still have at least some financial cushion to 
fall back on. Their argument is that even with positive equity a trigger event may cost more than 
the remaining equity in the house and therefore cause the borrower to go insolvent and 
subsequently default.  
Likewise, there has been a substantial amount of literature on the theory of defaulting 
strategically. There have been varying hypotheses on the severity of strategic behavior, however. 
Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985) were the first to apply the term “ruthless” to this type of 
behavior. They concluded that borrowers acted “ruthlessly” by abandoning their mortgage 
obligations immediately upon the advent of negative equity (Vandell 1995).  However, a number 
of publications since have argued against the severity of this ruthless behavior (see Vandell 1995 
for an extensive report against the idea of strict ruthlessness).  Non-ruthlessness and the 
admittance of the importance of trigger events did not dissolve the theory of strategic behavior, 
though; but rather, they refined it. Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993, 1994) argue for the idea of 
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“near-ruthless” behavior, stating that in a realistic model the house value is likely to drop well 
below the value of the mortgage before someone will choose to default.  
Bhutta, Dokko and Shan (2010) perform an extensive examination of the behavior of 
defaulters in the subprime mortgage market, taking a close look at the extent of the effects of 
negative equity and accounting for liquidity shocks. Using mortgage data and ZIP-code level 
housing price indices from First American CoreLogic they were able to produce a sample size of 
over 130,000 loans with no missing data on a number of different variables. Aside from 
individual loan characteristics the paper looks at location (Arizona, California, Florida or 
Nevada), unemployment rates and credit card delinquency rates (to account for economic 
shocks), house value, mortgage balance, equity, age of loan, interest rate, FICO scores, etc. They 
found the median borrower “walks away” from their mortgage when equity reaches -62%. 
Modeling the defaults accounted to liquidity shocks and comparing those to unconditional 
defaults, they found a number of defaulters choosing to do so strategically. Defaults that occur 
when a borrower is only slightly below zero equity, the authors argue, can almost certainly be 
attributed to liquidity shocks, stating that “...being slightly underwater is evidently not a 
sufficient condition for default.” As equity drops lower and lower more and more defaults are 
given the “strategic” title. 
The authors attempt to quantify a “total cost” of default. In such that if this total cost to 
default drops below the borrower’s negative percent equity the borrower will default.  This total 
cost includes a number of different costs including monetary and non-monetary costs of default 
as well as foregone expected capital gains. With this in mind they determined that once negative 
equity drops below -50%, half of defaults are strategic resulting in nearly 20% of total defaults 
being strategic. Discrepancy in FICO scores was also examined. The highest scores reflected the 
greatest value of negative equity (absolute value) displaying perhaps a sense of responsibility or 
obligation towards repaying their loan. However the lowest scores are not necessarily the 
quickest to walk away. They explain this phenomenon through the fact that the number of loans 
given to individuals with such low scores drops drastically and those few remaining are 
arduously screened. Therefore the lender, taking a perceived higher risk, attempts to lessen these 
risks by lending to only those they deem responsible. While those borrowers with a slightly 
higher score are screened less vigorously with the end result that they are willing to walk away 
from their loan at a higher equity level (median borrowers). 
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A large degree of heterogeneity was discovered amongst the sample, as noted by the 
large (58%) estimated standard deviation of total cost. One explanation is given to location, 
where median borrowers in Florida and Nevada (recourse states) have higher costs of default and 
thus delay defaulting until they are “20 to 30 percentage points more underwater than the median 
borrower in the non-recourse states.” 
It should be noted that aside from the quantifiable portions of the total cost—recourse 
penalties, relocation costs, to some extent expected capital gains, etc.—an almost crippling cost 
in some cases is the stigma associated with default and/or foreclosure. That is, the public tends to 
view defaulting in poor light. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) summarize this stigma nicely. 
Using survey data taken from December 2008 to March 2010 the authors find that 81% of 
respondents think strategically defaulting is “morally wrong.” They also find a level of spatial 
homogeneity in that respondents who have known someone who has strategically defaulted were 
more willing to do so themselves. They estimate that “by March 2010 [the percentage of defaults 
performed strategically] rose to 35.6%.” They also found that black and Hispanic respondents 
are much more likely than white and non-Hispanic respondents to default strategically given the 
same adverse conditions. 
Elmer and Seelig (1999) previously mentioned as proponents of trigger-event theory 
added in their findings that “strategic default remains a possibility, but only in antideficiency or 
other nonrecourse legal environments.” Ghent and Kudlyak (2010) look at the impact living in a 
recourse/non-recourse state has on a borrower’s decision to default. The threat of recourse 
implied by state law “decreases the probability of default when there is a substantial likelihood 
that a borrower has negative home equity.” In other words when a borrower is faced with the 
decision to stay or walk away from their under water mortgage they are much more likely to do 
so in a state whose laws will not allow for lenders to take recourse action.2 
                                                
2 See Ghent and Kudlyak (2010) for an extensive state-by-state breakdown of recourse laws. 
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Chapter 3 - Economic Theory 
In this section we present the economic theory behind our model. For the purpose of this 
paper it stands that a head of household, by 2009, will be in one of two scenarios: either they are 
late on their mortgage payments and therefore delinquent or they are current on their mortgage 
payments and non-delinquent. 
There are a number of different variables that affect whether or not a person is delinquent 
and these variables are often broken up into two categories: those that relate to trigger events and 
those that lead to strategic default. We look closely at these and control for them accordingly. A 
good deal of the literature out there supports the theory of trigger-event motivated delinquency 
(Quercia et al 1995, Elmer 1999, etc.). The specific trigger events we control for are job loss and 
a change in marital status. We would expect each of these to a have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of delinquency as both tend to adversely effect a borrower both financially and 
psychologically. Similarly, especially with the recent housing crisis, there is ample literature 
suggesting that often delinquency occurs as a matter of financial strategy (Bhutta et al 2010, 
Guiso et al 2009, Kau et al 1993, 1994, Vandell 1995, etc.). Aside from asking an individual 
outright if they strategically defaulted there is no definitive way to know that was the case (Guiso 
et al 2009). However, it is known that equity plays a large roll in the decision to strategically 
default. While it is technically possible for someone to default on his or her loan in the presence 
of decent positive equity it makes no sense financially to do so. It is dwindling equity and more 
so negative equity that leads to borrowers choosing not to make their mortgage payments and 
becoming delinquent. Therefore we control for a household’s equity with the underlying 
assumption that it will have a negative effect on the likelihood of delinquency. The more equity a 
homeowner has the less likely they should be to default on their mortgage obligations via 
delinquency and subsequent default (Vandell 1995, Bhutta et al 2010). The effect of living in a 
recourse or non-recourse state has also been shown to effect a borrower’s decision to choose 
delinquency. We expect someone living in a non-recourse state to be more likely to choose 
delinquency, as the penalty for doing so would be less severe than those living in states that 
allow recourse. 
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We include a number of demographic variables controlling for age, sex, race, ethnicity, 
education, martial status and children. We expect younger heads of household to be more likely 
to be delinquent on their mortgage by 2009. Older heads of households typically tend to 
demonstrate a degree of stability and a stronger sense of responsibility not found in younger 
owners. While being female, black or Hispanic has been shown in the past to have adverse 
effects on an individual’s income and homeownership the correlation between these traits and 
delinquency is still a fresh idea. Based on the trends of these traits we would expect that a 
female, black or Hispanic head of household would be more likely to be delinquent on their 
mortgage by 2009 and we construct our model with this in mind. We expect higher education 
and marriage to carry negative connotations with regards to delinquency. Marriage, similar to an 
increase in age, speaks to stability. The presence of children could go either way. On the one 
hand having children could be associated with an established family life, marriage, etc. that 
again, point to stability and would therefore decrease the likelihood of delinquency. Conversely, 
caring for children is expensive. Should a family in a tight financial situation experience a trigger 
event, having children would allow for less financial leeway. A homeowner only caring for 
themselves or perhaps a spouse will be more able to adapt to a financial crisis. We expect the 
presence of children to have a negative effect on the likelihood of delinquency but leave open the 
possibility of it doing the opposite based off the aforementioned scenarios. 
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Chapter 4 - Data and Empirical Model 
Our data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal survey 
of households collected yearly from 1968 to 1997. After 1997 the survey was adjusted, dropping 
some of the original core households and introducing others to the sample. After 1997 the survey 
was collected biennially and the sample weights were recalculated. The sample weights, when 
applied, make the PSID sample representative of the U.S. population (Turner 2009). For our 
analysis we weighted the data by their 2007 sample weights. Our data contain explanatory 
variables from 2005 and 2007, while the data for our dependent variable, delinquency, comes 
from 2009. In 2009, homeowners were asked directly, “Are you currently behind on your 
mortgage payments?”  This is how we define delinquency: if a homeowner answered yes, they 
are delinquent, if no, they are not. We find in our weighted sample than 5% of homeowners are 
delinquent on their mortgage payments by 2009. The minimum amount of time a homeowner is 
delinquent in our sample is one month, ruling out the possibility that a homeowner may have just 
missed their payment by a couple days or weeks. This also allows for some of our delinquent 
homeowners to be in default, while others may not necessarily be3. 
Using only data from the post-1997 era creates gaps from the off years for certain 
variables. Unemployment for instance captures only unemployment in the year prior to the 
survey. To adjust for this and to create our job loss and job instability variables we look instead 
at the respondent’s number of weeks employed at their current position. Job instability is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the respondent’s number of weeks employed in 2007 is less 
than the number of weeks employed in 2005, thus showing the respondent has spent at least 
some amount of time unemployed. Job loss is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the 
respondent’s number of weeks employed in 2005 is positive while the number of weeks 
employed in 2007 is zero. This shows that the respondent had a job previously but is 
unemployed by 2007. 
                                                
3 The term default is subjective and the length of time a homeowner is delinquent before default status is 
reached varies by lender and law. Typically a borrower is in default if they are 1, 2 or 3 months delinquent. The term 
delinquent as we use it includes those homeowners behind on their mortgage at least one month, in default according 
to the terms of their loan and those whose foreclosure process has begun. 
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We define equity as the difference between reported house value and the remaining 
principle on their first and second (if applicable) mortgages, divided by the house value.  The 
PSID collects some data on subsequent mortgages, however only the remaining principle is 
reported for the first two mortgages on a single house. 
Because total net-non housing wealth can often take on negative values we employed the 
common practice of shifting the scale of our values by adding the minimum plus 1 to all 
observations, thus making our former minimum one on our new scale (Osborne 2002). This shift 
allows us to perform the log transformation of wealth for our model without losing any 
observations. The same tactic was used to transform income as well. 
Change in marital status is a dummy variable constructed to equal 1 if marital status 
equals 1 for 2005 and 0 for 2007, implying the respondent was married in 2005 but no longer is 
in 2007. This change could be due to a number of things including death or divorce. It does not 
equal 1 if the respondent gets married between the years. It only captures the dissolution of a 
marriage for any reason. Children equals 1 if they have at least one child, 0 otherwise. Non-
recourse equals 1 if the respondent lives in a non-recourse state as defined by Ghent and Kudlyak 
(2010)4. 
Table 4.1 reports our weighted sample means5. We find there are important differences 
across groups. Referring to Table 4.1, households that are delinquent by 2009 are on average less 
likely to have a college degree and more likely to be female headed, Hispanic and black than 
non-delinquent households. Delinquent heads of households are also slightly more likely to be 
middle aged and have children. Delinquent heads of households on average are less likely to be 
married but more likely to experience a change in marital status (death, divorce, separation, etc.).  
                                                
4 Ghent and Kudlyak (2010) break up North Carolina by type of loan because recourse is not allowed on 
Purchase loans but is allowed on all others. We classify North Carolina as non-recourse because first mortgages are 
often purchase mortgages and very few in our sample have second mortgages that may in turn be susceptible to 
recourse. 
5 A note on sample sizes: While great care was taken to accurately impute true values for missing values in 
the data, it still stands that in some cases it was impossible to completely rid the sample of missing values without 
making substantial assumptions about the data. We were unwilling to compromise the integrity of the data with such 
large assumptions and therefore opted to drop those observations from the model when necessary (Models (4), (5) 
and (6)). We’ve provided summary statistics specific to these models and their slightly truncated samples in 
Appendix A.1 through A.4. 
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Table 4.1 Weighted Sample Means 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Mortgage Delinquency  0.05 1 0 
College Degree  0.42 0.15 0.44 
Children   0.43 0.58 0.42 
Income   101,912 71,248 103,553 
Female   0.19 0.30 0.19 
Married   0.67 0.61 0.67 
Change in Marital Status  0.03 0.05 0.03 
Hispanic   0.08 0.25 0.07 
Black   0.09 0.21 0.09 
AGE      
  18 to 34   0.19 0.17 0.19 
  35 to 64   0.71 0.79 0.70 
  65 or older   0.11 0.04 0.11 
Non-Recourse State  0.27 0.28 0.27 
Total Net Non-Housing Wealth 260,324 78,035 270,074 
Equity   43% 26% 44% 
Job Loss      
  2005 to 2007   0.08 0.10 0.08 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 weights. Sample size is 
3396 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
 
 With regards to income and wealth, we see that on average heads of households 
that are delinquent by 2009 have substantially lower incomes and total net non-housing wealth 
than non-delinquent heads of households, and, referring to Table 4.2, that income and wealth are 
skewed. The median income and wealth are much lower than the average for both groups. 
Looking again at Table 4.2 we find that delinquent heads of households experience a bigger drop 
in equity and are more likely to have become owners after 2005. Also delinquent heads of 
households tend to have lower house values than non-delinquent heads of households. 
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Table 4.2 Medians of Note and Additional Variable Means 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Income (median)  77,088 60,464 78,791 
Total Net Non-Housing Wealth (median) 42,857 6,374 46,374 
Equity (median)  42% 26% 43% 
CHG IN EQUITY (median)     
  2005 to 2007   3.7% 0.99% 3.8% 
  2007 to 2009   -3.5% -12% -3.4% 
HOUSE VALUE (median)     
  2005   203,297 161,538 208,779 
  2007   223,901 186,335 227,743 
  2009   200,000 150,000 200,000 
HOME OWNERSHIP     
  Owned in 2005  0.87 0.81 0.87 
  Owned After 2005  0.13 0.19 0.13 
Job Instability      
  2005 to 2007   0.20 0.24 0.20 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 
weights. Sample size is 3396 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
 
 LPM Model 
Using the PSID data and selecting only those who are homeowners in at least one of 
2005, 2007 or 2009, we examine the likelihood of mortgage delinquency by 2009.  Our data is 
weighted using the 2007 sample weights and after cleaning and imputing missing data our 
weighted sample includes 3,396 households. We adjust for possible clustering by state within the 
data. 
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The likelihood for head of household, n, to be delinquent on their mortgage is estimated 
based on our weighted sample to be 
(1) delinquentn = α + βidemographic +  δjtrigger  + γkstrategic+ ηmfinancial  + 
πsstate + εn, 
where delinquentn equals 1 if the head of household is delinquent on their mortgage by 2009 and 
zero otherwise. Demographic is an n by 8 matrix containing the demographic variables on 
education, children, sex, marital status, ethnicity, race, and age (young and middle-aged). 
Trigger is an n by 2 matrix containing those variables related to trigger events:  change in marital 
status and job loss. Strategic is an n by 2 matrix containing those variables pertaining to strategic 
defaulting:  non-recourse and equity. Financial is also an n by 2 matrix containing individual n’s 
log-income and log-wealth. State is an unreported dummy variable that controls for the state of 
residence of the respondent. This should help control for varying economic effects across the 
country. 
 Probit Model 
Using the same weighted data as in equation (1) we apply a probit estimation and find 
that the likelihood a head of household will be delinquent on their mortgage by 2009 is 
(2) prob(delinquentn) = Φ(α + βidemographic +  δjtrigger  + γkstrategic + ηmfinancial  
+ πsstate), 
where prob(delinquentn) equals 1 if the head of household is delinquent on their mortgage by 
2009 and zero otherwise. Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. All 
variables in equation (2) are the same as those included in equation (1). 
Due to the initial drawbacks of the LPM (incorrectly estimating values outside our 
possible range of 0 or 1) we estimate both an LPM model and a probit model to insure accuracy 
within our results.  The probit model is better suited for a binary dependent variable; however, its 
assumption that the error term follows a standard normal distribution is a strong one that may not 
hold true. Keeping this in mind we run both models and compare results accordingly. 
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Chapter 5 - Empirical Results 
Table 5.1 presents the Linear Probability coefficient estimates with robust standard 
errors.6  Across models, the coefficient estimates consistently indicate that black and Hispanic 
homeowners as well as homeowners with children are more likely to be delinquent on their 
mortgage than other groups. Looking at our final model, Model (6), a black homeowner is 6.1 
percentage points more likely to be delinquent and a Hispanic homeowner is 10.3 percentage 
points more likely to be delinquent. These increased percentage points are large and correspond 
to increases in the likelihood of delinquency of 122% and 206%, respectively. While having 
children increases this likelihood by 32% with an increase in percentage points of 1.6. 
Conversely having a college degree significantly reduces the likelihood of delinquency.  A 
decrease of 4.0 percentage points due to the homeowner having a college degree corresponds to 
an 80% decrease in the likelihood of delinquency. These results remain significant throughout all 
models and the percentage points only vary slightly. 
State dummy variables are included in Models (2) through (6). Model (3) includes the 
variable job loss. With this inclusion in the model, surprisingly, we see that controlling for other 
factors, neither trigger event—job loss or change in marital status—has any significant result. 
This insignificance maintains throughout all models. Models (4), (5) and (6) build off of (3) by 
including equity, total net non-housing wealth and whether or not the homeowner lives in a non-
recourse state, respectively. Equity has strong negative effects on the likelihood of delinquency. 
Increasing a homeowner’s equity by 10 percentage point will decrease the likelihood of 
delinquency by .71 percentage points thus leading to a 14.2% decrease in the likelihood of 
delinquency according to our initial equity inclusion model, Model (4). Subsequent models yield 
similar results with only a slight decrease in the overall effect of equity (13.8% vs. 14.2%). 
                                                
6As R2 values are often misrepresentative of longitudinal data (Hill 2001), to deter confusion these values 
are not reported with the coefficient estimates in Table 5.1. However, for consistency we have included them in a 
separate index, which can be found in Appendix A.5. 
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Table 5.1 Linear Probability Model Estimates of Mortgage Delinquency 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Base States 
Job 
Loss Equity Wealth Recourse 
Intercept  .160** .109* .108* .119* .178** .178** 
  (.071) (.063) (.064) (.064) (.068) (.068) 
College Degree  -.042*** -.041*** -.041*** -.040*** -.040*** -.040*** 
  (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Children  .017* .018** .018** .016* .016* .016* 
  (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Log Income  -.013** -.013** -.013** -.010* -.007 -.007 
  (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Female  .037** .033* .033* .028 .027 .027 
  (.018) (.018) (.018) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Married  .009 .007 .007 .007 .007 .007 
  (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
Change in Marital Status .012 .018 .018 .025 .027 .027 
  (.028) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.029) (.029) 
Hispanic  .101*** .106*** .105*** .104*** .103*** .103*** 
  (.017) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Black  .060*** .063*** .063*** .062*** .061*** .061*** 
  (.020) (.021) (.021) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
AGE        
  18 to 34  .028** .027* .028* .003 -.001 -.001 
  (.014) (.015) (.015) (.019) (.018) (.018) 
  35 to 64  .037*** .034** .034** .022 .020 .020 
  (.013) (.013) (.014) (.015) (.014) (.014) 
Non-Recourse State      .146*** 
       (.006) 
Log Total Net        
   Non-Housing Wealth     -.007* -.007* 
      (.004) (.004) 
Equity     -.071*** -.069*** -.069*** 
     (.023) (.023) (.023) 
Job Loss    .013 .012 .012 .012 
    (.015) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Sample Size   3396 3396 3396 3384 3380 3380 
Note: Our dependent variable is delinquency, where delinquency equals 1 if the borrower is late on their 
mortgage and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Our base model shows a minimal yet significant negative effect of income on the 
probability of delinquency that carries through the inclusion of state dummies, job loss and 
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equity. In our base model we see that a $10,000 increase in income yields a .13 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of delinquency; this corresponds to a 2.6% decrease in the likelihood 
of mortgage delinquency. However, the inclusion of wealth essentially “swallows up” the 
income effect. We find that between the two measures of financial status it is the more 
encompassing wealth variable that significantly (albeit minimally) affects a homeowner’s 
likelihood of delinquency. 
With the inclusion of further variables in subsequent models we find a refinement effect. 
Many significant variables remain intact while others lose significance with the addition of new 
variables. Female head and age, like income before, are both significant in the earlier models but 
lose such significance as the model becomes more refined. In the base model we find that 
female-headed households are 74% more likely to be delinquent than their male counterparts. 
We also find that young and middle-age homeowners are 56% and 74%, respectively, more 
likely to be delinquent than those homeowners of retirement age. All of these effects fade out, 
however, with the inclusion of such variables as equity, wealth and non-recourse. Where the 
argument could be made that there is some correlation between female-headed households and 
equity or wealth due to underlying sexual discrimination, it could be argued it is more the case of 
model refinement. Earlier models were probably leaving out key variables and consequently 
insignificant variables were given more significance than they merit. The same could be said for 
age with the idea that older borrowers have more time to accrue wealth and more time to pay 
down their mortgage principle resulting in higher equity. But again, we do not believe that is the 
case. 
The inclusion of wealth, while significant, has very little effect on the outcome of the 
model. A $10,000 increase in wealth correlates to a decrease of .03 percentage points and thus a 
decrease of only .54% in the likelihood of delinquency. Its lack of magnitude is peculiar though 
as now, with income being insignificant, the only substantial measure of a homeowner’s 
financial health comes from our equity variable. Considering the wealth measure does not 
include home equity there should be no direct correlation between the two. The argument could 
be made here for a correlation between wealth and equity; the more wealth an individual has the 
more likely they are to have a higher-valued home (which would be an indirect correlation with 
equity). While this isn’t necessarily the case it could possibly explain the weak effect of wealth. 
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Model (6) includes the variable for non-recourse. We find results congruent with 
previous literature (Ghent 2010). A homeowner residing in a non-recourse state is 14.6 
percentage points more likely to be delinquent, corresponding to a 292% increase in the 
likelihood of delinquency versus a homeowner living in a recourse state. This is a substantial 
increase that along with the significant effects of equity points to a number of delinquent 
homeowners being of the strategic variety. 
Marital status, change in marital status, and job loss all retain insignificant coefficients 
throughout the models. As mentioned before, this is especially alarming for the change in marital 
status and job loss variables. The insignificance of these two variables in particular leads to the 
argument that trigger events leading up to 2009 are less significant than those found in previous 
periods. Marital status is an institutional variable that carries with it the underlying belief that 
married couples tend to be more financially fit and thus more able to “weather the storm.” While 
this may be true in the case of trigger events not related to a change in marital status it would 
seem almost irrelevant in the case of homeowners applying a strategic method of defaulting. A 
spouse cannot prevent a sudden drop in house prices. With other variables hinting strongly at 
strategic behavior, it would make sense that marital status would be insignificant. 
Table 5.2 presents the probit coefficient estimates with robust standard errors.7 Across 
models the coefficient estimates consistently indicate that black and Hispanic homeowners are 
more likely to be delinquent on their mortgage than other groups. Similar to our LPM estimates, 
across all models the probit coefficient estimates also show a strong negative effect of having a 
college degree. Table 5.3 reports the marginal effects from the probit estimation, computed using 
the normal probability distribution evaluated at the sample means of the control variables.  
In Model (6) we find that black homeowners are 2.6 percentage points more likely to be 
delinquent, corresponding to a 53% increase in the likelihood of delinquency. Similarly Hispanic 
heads of households show an increase of 3.5 percentage points in the likelihood of delinquency; 
this corresponds to a 71% increase in the likelihood of delinquency. As in our LPM models we 
find that having children increases the likelihood of delinquency in our probit models, too. A 
homeowner with at least one child is 20% more likely to be delinquent than a homeowner with 
no children. 
                                                
7 Likelihood Ratios are reported with corresponding models in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Probit Coefficient Estimates of Mortgage Delinquency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Base States Job Loss Equity Wealth Recourse 
Intercept -.805 -4.52*** -4.51*** -4.51*** -3.15 -3.15*** 
 (.753) (.495) (.698) (.756) (11.8) (1.07) 
College Degree -.552*** -.558*** -.559*** -.557*** -.542*** -.542*** 
 (.116) (.122) (.122) (.121) (.123) (.123) 
Children .190** .217** .218** .200** .199** .199** 
 (.090) (.091) (.092) (.096) (.096) (.096) 
Log Income -.131** -.149*** -.151*** -.129** -.098* -.098* 
 (.058) (.054) (.054) (.056) (.054) (.054) 
Female .373** .321* .320* .282* .270 .270 
 (.166) (.170) (.171) (.170) (.172) (.172) 
Married .104 .085 .080 .093 .091 .091 
 (.130) (.136) (.134) (.142) (.143) (.143) 
Change in Marital Status .073 .106 .100 .140 .151 .151 
 (.236) (.248) (.246) (.242) (.243) (.243) 
Hispanic .626*** .720*** .718*** .713*** .708*** .708*** 
 (.106) (.118) (.118) (.124) (.126) (.126) 
Black .460*** .520*** .520*** .529*** .529*** .529*** 
 (.120) (.132) (.131) (.129) (.132) (.132) 
AGE       
  18 to 34 .431* .453* .459* .352 .283 .283 
 (.258) (.260) (.265) (.317) (.314) (.314) 
  35 to 64 .510** .513** .519** .529* .488 .488 
 (.253) (.251) (.254) (.303) (.300) (.300) 
Non-Recourse State      4.56*** 
      (.189) 
Log Total Net       
    Non-Housing Wealth     -.132** -.132** 
     (.061) (.061) 
Equity    -.644*** -.629*** -.629*** 
    (.187) (.187) (.187) 
Job Loss   .152 .142 .151 .151 
   (.150) (.166) (.165) (.165) 
Likelihood Ratio 152.9 218.3 219.4 249.1 252.3 252.3 
Sample Size 3396 3396 3396 3384 3380 3380 
Note: Our dependent variable is delinquency, where delinquency equals 1 if the borrower is late on their mortgage 
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5.3 Marginal Effects of Probit Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Base States Job Loss Equity Wealth Recourse 
Intercept  -.040 .109*** .108*** .119*** .178 .178*** 
College Degree  -.042*** -.041*** -.041*** -.040*** -.040*** -.040*** 
Children  .017** .018** .018*** .016** .016** .016** 
Income  -.0006** -.0007*** -.0007*** -.0006** -.0005* -.0005* 
Female  .037** .033* .033* .028* .027 .027 
Married  .009 .007 .007 .007 .007 .007 
Change in Marital 
Status .012 .018 .018 .025 .027 .027 
Hispanic  .101*** .106*** .105*** .104*** .103*** .103*** 
Black  .060*** .063*** .063*** .062*** .061*** .061*** 
AGE        
  18 to 34  .028* .027* .028* .003 -.001 -.001 
  35 to 64  .037** .034** .034** .022* .020 .020 
Non-Recourse State      .146 
Total Net        
   Non-Housing Wealth     -.0003** -.0003** 
Equity     -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** 
Job Loss    .013 .012 .012 .012 
Sample Size   3396 3396 3396 3384 3380 3380 
Note: Our dependent variable is delinquency, where delinquency equals 1 if the borrower is late on their mortgage 
and 0 otherwise. Income and Total Net Non-Housing Wealth are per $10,000 increase. Equity is per %10 increase. 
Significance of marginal effects based on significance of corresponding coefficient estimates. 
 
Having a college degree lowers the likelihood of delinquency by 2.7 percentage points 
causing a 54% decrease in the likelihood of delinquency. Total net non-housing wealth, income 
and equity all have a negative effect on the likelihood of delinquency, as well. We find that an 
increase in total net non-housing wealth of $10,000 reduces the likelihood of delinquency by .03 
percentage points, corresponding to a decrease in the likelihood of delinquency of .51%. An 
increase in income of $10,000 reduces the likelihood of delinquency by .05 percentage points, 
which corresponds to a decrease in the likelihood of delinquency of .96%. While these figures 
are small they remain significant and it should be noted that with the inclusion of total net non-
housing wealth in Models (5) and (6) the income effect remains significant (unlike our LPM 
results). Equity has a more substantial effect than both wealth and income. Increasing equity by 
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10 percentage points decreases the likelihood of delinquency by .31 percentage points, which 
corresponds to a 6.3% percent decrease in the likelihood of delinquency. 
Referring again to Model (6) we find that non-recourse has, similar to the LPM model, 
the most profound effect on delinquency. Homeowners living in a non-recourse state are 23 
percentage points more likely to be delinquent than those residing in a state with recourse; this 
corresponds to a 456% increase in the likelihood of delinquency. As likelihood ratios show (as 
well as other variables’ identical coefficient estimates from Model (5) to Model (6)), adding the 
variable for non-recourse has little overall effect on the fit of the model. It appears the 
significance of living in a non-recourse state could have been dispersed across the actual state 
dummy variables for non-recourse states. Once the variable for non-recourse was included it 
would follow that those state dummy variables would lose significance. It other words, it is not 
the state a homeowner resides in that matters so much as the type of state—recourse or non-
recourse. 
Inspecting the coefficient estimates for both the LPM and probit models we find very few 
conflicting results. Similar to the LPM models we find in the probit models that sex and age lose 
significance with the inclusion of other significant variables (equity or wealth); also marital 
status, change in marital status, and job loss remain insignificant across all models. Unlike the 
LPM models, in the probit estimation income retains significance through our final model, 
Model (6). In both the LPM and probit models having a college degree, total net non-housing 
wealth and equity all have significant negative effects on the likelihood of delinquency, while 
having children, being Hispanic, being black and living in a non-recourse state all have 
significant positive effects on the likelihood of delinquency for a homeowner.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
Many homeowners have suffered form weaker financial security because of decreasing 
house values, rising unemployment and a number of economic hardships. The ability to make a 
mortgage payment is not always an option and even when it is some borrowers are choosing not 
to make it given their adverse conditions. Mortgage delinquency has become more common due 
to people’s inability to pay in this harsh economic climate coupled with people’s unwillingness 
to pay given the status of their situation. Our research supports the validity of strategic default 
but lacks any contribution to the theory of trigger events. While we hesitate to refute the 
importance of trigger events we are obliged to point out their insignificance within our study. 
Controlling for both a homeowner’s newfound inability to pay (trigger events) and a 
homeowner’s unwillingness to pay (strategic) we run six versions of two different models and 
find glaring incongruities in the demographics of borrowers. Even while controlling for these 
outside influences we find large racial and ethnic gaps in the likelihood of delinquency. The 
results imply that all else equal there are still certain unobservable characteristics or events that 
are affecting the rate of delinquency among black and Hispanic households specifically. The 
degree of these differences merits further research on the topic. To gain further insight on this, 
further research could take into account the urban/rural dynamic. A look at recent policy is also 
merited as recently programs have been installed to increase homeownership among minorities. 
While these programs have good intentions it might be that they are setting people up for failure. 
Regardless of policy it remains that the underlying threat lies in the unobservable effects of being 
black or Hispanic and further research specifically in this area is necessary. 
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Appendix A - Additional Tables 
Table A.1 Weighted Sample Means, n = 3384 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Mortgage Delinquency  0.05 1 0 
College Degree  0.42 0.15 0.44 
Children   0.43 0.58 0.42 
Income   102,061 71,694 103,677 
Female   0.19 0.29 0.19 
Married   0.66 0.61 0.67 
Change in Marital Status  0.03 0.05 0.03 
Hispanic   0.08 0.26 0.07 
Black   0.09 0.21 0.09 
AGE      
  18 to 34   0.19 0.16 0.19 
  35 to 64   0.71 0.80 0.70 
  65 or older   0.11 0.04 0.11 
Non-Recourse State  0.27 0.28 0.27 
Total Net Non-Housing Wealth (TNW) 260,824 78,730 270,512 
Equity   43% 26% 44% 
Job Loss      
  2005 to 2007   0.08 0.10 0.08 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 weights. Sample size is 
3384 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
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Table A.2 Medians of Note and Additional Variable Means, n = 3384 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Income (median)  77,198 60,464 78,849 
TNW (median)  42,857 6,374 46,484 
Equity (median)  42% 26% 43% 
CHG IN EQUITY (median)     
  2005 to 2007   3.7% 0.99% 3.8% 
  2007 to 2009   -3.5% -12% -3.4% 
HOUSE VALUE (median)     
  2005   203,297 161,538 208,779 
  2007   223,901 186,335 227,743 
  2009   200,000 150,000 200,000 
HOME OWNERSHIP     
  Owned in 2005  0.87 0.82 0.87 
  Owned After 2005  0.13 0.18 0.13 
Job Instability      
  2005 to 2007   0.20 0.24 0.20 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 
weights. Sample size is 3384 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
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Table A.3 Weighted Sample Means, n = 3380 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Mortgage Delinquency  0.05 1 0 
College Degree  0.42 0.15 0.44 
Children   0.43 0.58 0.42 
Income   102,093 71,723 103,708 
Female   0.19 0.29 0.19 
Married   0.66 0.62 0.67 
Change in Marital Status  0.03 0.05 0.03 
Hispanic   0.08 0.26 0.07 
Black   0.09 0.21 0.09 
AGE      
  18 to 34   0.19 0.16 0.19 
  35 to 64   0.71 0.80 0.70 
  65 or older   0.11 0.04 0.11 
Non-Recourse State  0.27 0.28 0.27 
Total Net Non-Housing Wealth (TNW) 260,824 78,730 270,512 
Equity   43% 27% 44% 
Job Loss      
  2005 to 2007   0.08 0.10 0.08 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 weights. Sample size is 
3380 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
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Table A.4 Medians of Note and Additional Variable Means, n = 3380 
Variable Definition   All Homeowners Delinquent Current 
Income (median)  77,305 60,464 78,849 
TNW (median)  42,857 6,374 46,484 
Equity (median)  42% 26% 43% 
CHG IN EQUITY (median)     
  2005 to 2007   3.7% 0.99% 3.8% 
  2007 to 2009   -3.5% -12% -3.4% 
HOUSE VALUE (median)     
  2005   203,297 161,538 208,779 
  2007   223,901 186,335 227,743 
  2009   200,000 150,000 200,000 
HOME OWNERSHIP     
  Owned in 2005  0.87 0.82 0.87 
  Owned After 2005  0.13 0.18 0.13 
Job Instability      
  2005 to 2007   0.20 0.24 0.20 
Note: All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2009 dollars. Data are weighted using 2007 weights. Sample size is 
3380 homeowners observed from 2005 to 2009 biennially. 
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Table A.5 R2 Values for Linear Probability Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Base States Job Loss Equity Wealth Recourse 
Adjusted R2  4.66% 5.03% 5.03% 6.03% 6.04% 6.04% 
R2  4.94% 6.69% 6.71% 7.72% 7.76% 7.76% 
Sample Size   3396 3396 3396 3384 3380 3380 
 
